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The Deinomenids  
 
The ancient sources make no reference to the fleet of Syracuse until the be-
ginning of the 5
th
 century BCE. In particular, Thucydides, when considering the 
Greek maritime powers at the time of the rise of the Athenian empire, includes 
among them the tyrants of Sicily
1
. Other sources refer more precisely to Gelon’s 
fleet, during the Carthaginian invasion in Sicily. Herodotus, when the Greeks en-
voys asked for Gelon’s help to face Xerxes’ attack, mentions the lord of Syracuse 
promising to provide, amongst other things, 200 triremes in return of the com-
mand of the Greek forces
2
. The same number of ships is also mentioned by Ti-
maeus
3
 and Ephorus
4
. It is very odd, though, that we hear nothing of this fleet 
during the Carthaginian campaign and the Battle of Himera in either the narration 
of Diodorus, or the briefer one of Herodotus
5
. Nevertheless, other sources imply 
some kind of naval fighting in Himera. Pausanias saw offerings from Gelon and 
the Syracusans taken from the Phoenicians in either a sea or a land battle
6
. In 
addition, the Scholiast to the first Pythian of Pindar, in two different situations – 
the second one being from Ephorus – says that Gelon destroyed the Carthaginians 
in a sea battle when they attacked Sicily
7
.  
 
1
 Thuc. I 14, 2: ὀλίγον τε πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν καὶ τοῦ ∆αρείου θανάτου … τριήρεις περί τε 
Σικελίαν τοῖς τυράννοις ἐς πλῆθος ἐγένοντο καὶ Κερκυραίοις.  
2
 Hdt. VII 158.  
3
 Timae. FGrHist 566 F94= Polyb. XII 26b, 1-5, but the set is not the court of Gelon, but the 
conference of the mainland Greeks in Corinth. It is worth mentioning, though, that Polybius in the 
same passage further attacks Timaeus for his credibility.  
4
 Ephor. FGrHist 2a 70 F186= Scholia in Pind. Pyth. I 146b. 
5
 Diod. XI 20-25; Hdt. VII 165-167. According to Meister 1967, 42-43, the whole episode of 
the Himera campaign in Diodorus derives from Timaeus.  
6
 Paus. VI 19, 7.  
7
 Scholia in Pind. Pyth. 1, 146a; Scholia in Pind. Pyth. I 146b= Ephor. FGrHist 2a 70, F186.  
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Some scholars tried to reconcile the references of the sources. Pugliese Car-
ratelli
8
 and Dunbabin
9
 supposed that Gelon’s fleet engaged a battle with Anaxi-
las’. Dunbabin added also some Pindaric passages from which sea fighting in 480 
BCE could be inferred
10
. Dunbabin’s hypothesis has been proved very stimulating 
and many scholars have followed him
11
. Others, though, have dismissed the pos-
sibility of any kind of sea fighting
12
. According to my view, a close reading of the 
passages quoted by Dunbabin does not show any sea fighting in 480 BCE. Even 
if we accept that Pausanias refers to Himera
13
, he himself does not seem to know 
whether the battle mentioned was fought on land or at sea
14
, while the Scholiast’s 
passage is too full of inaccuracies to be completely trusted
15
. Finally, the sea 
fighting, in which Chromios and Hegesias took part – according to Dunbabin –, 
could easily be the Battle of Cumae
16
.  
In conclusion, I must exclude the possibility of a major sea battle in 480 
BCE. The silence of both Diodorus and Herodotus is decisive in this matter, and 
the other passages mentioned do not prove the opposite. Nevertheless, this cannot 
exclude the option that Gelon did possess a fleet. But should we trust the figure 
of 200 triremes mentioned, and if yes, why did this fleet not engage a battle?  
On the one hand, I must remark that this number seems suspiciously round 
and close to the size of the fleet provided by the Athenians at the Battle of Salamis. 
Moreover, 200 ships are a large naval force, probably too big not to be mentioned 
by Herodotus and Diodorus as taking part in the battle. Finally, maybe 200 ships 
 
8
 Pugliese Carratelli 1932, 432.  
9
 Dunbabin 1948, 425-426. 
10
 Pind. Nem., 9, 42, postulates that Chromios was Gelon’s admiral; see Pind. Ol., 6, 9, 10, for 
Hegesias’ participation in sea fighting.  
11
 For example, Vallet 1958, 364; Berve 1967, 144; Burn 1990, 482; Kufofka 1993-94, 268 n. 
51; Mafodda 1996, 126 with n. 94.  
12
 Ameling 1993, 43; Bravo 1993, 446-447; Zahrnt 1993, 361, n. 26; 377, n. 72, adding that 
the reference to sea fighting is, as a whole, a later invention; Luraghi 1994, 307 with n. 145; Krings 
1998, 301-302; Milinno 2001, 140 n. 63; Coretti 2006, 424, n. 35; 417.  
13
 Frazer 1965, 61, says that the spoils are almost certainly from Himera, but see Krings 1998, 
301 who remarks that nothing in Pausanias’ passage confirms such a supposition. Himera could be 
reasonably inferred in this dedication but it is not the only possible battle.  
14
 Bravo 1993, 446; Luraghi 1994, 307, n.145; Krings 1998, 302 who adds that the sea or land 
battle in Pausanias is explained by the fact that the latter likes to complement the great historians and 
especially Herodotus.  
15
 Bravo 1993, 446; Luraghi 1994, 307, n.145; Milinno 2001, 140, n. 163. Both Bravo and 
Luraghi consider the whole scholion as an error of the Scholiast. The mistakes are: a) the embassy is 
mentioned as being sent from Athens, not from the Greeks in general; b) it was sent to Hieron, 
Gelon’s successor, not to Gelon himself; c) a pact was made which does not seem possible since in 
that case it should have been mentioned by either Diodorus or Herodotus.  
16
 Bravo 1993, 447; adding that the fighting in which Hegesias took place was not against 
Anaxilas but against the Phoenicians; Luraghi 1994, 307, n. 145, who adds that Chromios’ bravery 
in sea battles is conventionally mentioned along with his bravery as an infantry and cavalry fighter.  
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needed to be declared by Gelon if he was to make a claim to the leadership.  
 On the other hand, the two hundred ships are mentioned by many sources 
(Timaeus through Polybius, Herodotus and Ephorus through the scholiast)
17
. 
Moreover, Thucydides’ reference to the tyrants of Sicily as possessors of a re-
markable fleet is easily applicable to Gelon
18
. It is difficult to give a definite an-
swer. Athens’ example is significant in showing that Gelon could have managed 
to build such a fleet in a few years, especially if he was expecting an attack by 
Carthage. Maybe, some components of this fleet had already taken part in the war 
to free the emporia, which Gelon says he waged against Carthage at an earlier 
stage
19
.  
But if Gelon had such a large fleet, why did it not participate in the Battle of 
Himera? I think that there are various possibilities. The first hypothesis is the one 
previously expressed by Dunbabin, who supposed that the straits of Messina were 
blocked. Another suggestion comes down to reasons of strategy. Gelon’s navy 
was inferior to his enemies and quite probably inexperienced at overcoming an 
enemy fleet whilst outnumbered, since all the war operations where Herodotus 
mentions Gelon taking part in, before 480 BCE, were on land
20
. A final possibility 
could arise if we consider that Gelon preferred using free people to man his ships, 
namely from the lower or middle classes of the cities he controlled, and mostly 
from Syracuse, and not slaves
21
. In that case, Gelon could have thought that it was 
better not to fight at sea at all than to man the ships with forces more experienced 
and valuable in land battles. This is because of the danger of being defeated by 
the more sea-experienced Carthaginians and then losing valuable soldiers which 
were to be needed in the decisive battle which was expected to take place on 
land
22
.  
 
17
 It is possible, though, that they all have a common initial source; probably Antiochus or even 
Herodotus.  
18
 Maddoli 1980, 33; Hornblower 1991, 47, says that Thucydides probably refers to Hip-
pokrates and Anaxilas. But if Hippokrates had a reasonable fleet, his successor Gelon would have at 
least the same navy, if not a bigger one, since he also had Syracuse under his command.  
19
 Hdt. VII 158.  
20
 Hdt. VII 155-156. 
21
 Griffin 2005, 121, based also on Casson 1971, 323-324, postulates that mercenaries or slaves 
were more unlikely to have manned these ships and that Gelon’s fleet was constituted by citizen forces, 
perhaps with some Kyllyrioi, namely free native Sicels, and other allies mixed in. This approach is close 
to my view of the crews in Gelon’s fleet. On the other hand, of course, it cannot be excluded that Gelon 
could have used slaves, either from the cities he had enslaved such as Megara and Euboea (Hdt. VII 
156, 2-3, but it is worth mentioning that the people enslaved were sold out of Sicily) or from other 
sources. The latter would be of much lower cost for him, but also less eager to fight. 
22
 Of course this last analysis is speculative and based mostly on the Athenian model of man-
ning the fleet at that same period, although it cannot be excluded that the Athenians did use slaves as 
rowers later in the fifth century. For this last issue, see among others Dover 1970, 388; Graham 1992; 
Hunt 1998, 90; Morrison-Coates-Rankov 2000, 117 cf.; Hornblower 2008, 563. Contra Casson 1971, 
Andreas Morakis 
266 www.historika.unito.it 
Six years after Himera, Hieron, Gelon’s brother and successor in the govern-
ment of Syracuse, won a great naval victory. Diodorus says that Cumae threatened 
by the Etruscans asked for Hieron’s help. Hieron responded to this request and 
sent a significant number of ships to assist Cumae. According to Diodorus, these 
ships, together with the Cumaean, won a decisive battle against the Etruscans 
causing them many casualties and freed Cumae from the Etruscan threat
23
. Un-
fortunately, Diodorus does not give any numbers for this fleet. We should not ex-
pect them to be numerous though, since he supplemented the fleet of Cumae; thus, 
it would definitely be less than 100 ships. The dispatch of this navy along with the 
campaigns of Hiero against Croton and Rhegion, which preceded it
24
, indicates 
two very important things. The first is directly related to the analysis of Gelon’s 
fleet in Himera. It is very tempting to consider that Hieron relied on the navy that 
his brother built for his campaigns, especially for the campaign against the Etrus-
cans. The fact that Hieron possessed an important fleet which could assist Cu-
mae
25
 indicates that Syracuse had a good navy in 474 BCE. The most likely period 
during which this fleet would have been built was soon before the Carthaginian 
invasion of 480 BCE. Of course it could be claimed that Gelon built his fleet after 
Himera from the spoils and the recompense he took from the Carthaginians
26
 or 
even that the fleet which faced the Etruscans was built by Hieron himself after the 
death of his brother in 478 BCE
27
. However, in my opinion, the available data 
point more to the first case, without excluding the possibility that Hieron also took 
some measures to enlarge this fleet.  
The second important feature is Hieron’s will to expand Syracuse’s power 
beyond Sicily and his interest in the area of the Tyrrhenian Sea. Some scholars 
observe that this policy could have also been initiated for commercial reasons, 
namely the control of the commercial transactions between Campania and the 
north part of the Tyrrhenian Sea
28
. Nevertheless, in my view, it should merely be 
considered as the will of a monarch to expand his influence for reasons of prestige 
 
323-324, previously mentioned.  
23
 Diod. XI 51. For this victory, see also Pind. Pyth. I 70-75; Schol. in Pind. Pyth. I 137a. From 
the latter scholion it seems that the Carthaginians were present at the battle of Cumae at the side of 
their old allies, but see Huss 1990, 59-60; Kufofka 1993/4, 271, n. 60. Moreover, I should remark that 
it seems very improbable that Carthage after such a great defeat a few years earlier could become 
involved again in a war against the tyrant of Syracuse, since no vital interests were menaced at Cumae.  
24
 For these campaigns, see De Sensi Sestito 1981, mainly 626 cf.; Luraghi 1994, 349-350.  
25
 Diodorus says that the Etruscans were masters of the sea (Τυρρηνῶν θαλαττοκρατούντων), 
meaning that a sizable fleet was needed to confront them. 
26
 Diod. XI 26, 2 mentions 2000 talents.  
27
 As Corretti 2006, 421, stands.  
28
 For example, Maddoli 1980, 54; Mafodda 1992, 267, n.82; Consolo Langher 1997, 38; Brac-
cesi 1998, 37 (for Gelon’s commercial interests); 42 for Hieron’s.  
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and power and also an attempt to match his brother’s achievements and reputa-
tion
29
. Alongside his plans for expansion should also be viewed the naval base 
which, according to Strabo, he built at Pithecoussae
30
. This naval base shows that 
Hieron did not consider the fleet as an instrument to be used only in certain con-
ditions, and then left until needed again, but as a permanent tool of expansion and 
influence in distant places. In this context the possession of a fleet merely as de-
fensive weapon for the rebuttal of the Carthaginian invasion is transformed in a 
very small span of time to an offensive instrument for intervention and expansion 
in distant places. At the same period the identical evolution is easily traceable and 
better documented of course, for Athens.  
As for the synthesis of this navy I expect the same to be mentioned as before 
for Gelon’s fleet. Griffin is right to exclude the possibility of skilled mercenaries
31
. 
Such men were more likely to fight as hoplites and work as farmers, like the 
10.000 to whom citizenship was granted by Gelon
32
. Also slaves must be ex-
cluded. I expect that this fleet was manned mainly by the lower classes of the 
cities controlled by Hieron and mainly from Syracuse
33
. The existence of the na-
val base in the Gulf of Naples shows also that Hieron needed naval crews for 
longer and more permanent periods of times; thus that part of the population of 
the lower classes could benefit from it and earn wages on the same permanent 
basis. By manning his ships with members of the lower classes Hieron was giving 
them the notion that they were also members of the community under his rule, 
integrating a greater part of the Greek population in the political system and gain-
ing their support by providing wages.  
In 466 BCE, during the rebellion of the Syracusans against Thrasybulus, Di-
odorus mentions that both parties possessed ships and that they engaged also in 
battle
34
. A little later, after the expulsion of the tyrant, the Syracusans won at sea 
against the rebel ex-mercenaries of Gelon
35
. I do not expect many ships to have 
 
29
 The phrase of Alcibiades (Thuc. VI 18, 2) is very suitable for Hieron.  
30
 Strab. V 4, 9. With this naval base he could check movements around the Gulf of Naples as 
has been remarked (Staccioli 1991, 114; Consolo Langher 1997, 38; Haynes 2000, 262). Giuffrida 
Ientile 1983, 67, wrongly refers to this base as a military colony. Scholars have also related Hieron’s 
involvement in the area to the foundation of Neapolis (Lepore 1967, 128 and 157; Maddoli 1980, 54; 
Giuffrida Ientile 1983, 67; Mafodda 1992, 267, n.82; Sartori 1992, 93; Luraghi 1994, 352-353, with 
n. 346; Consolo Langher 1997, 38-39). Millino 2001, 150, n.8, based on Strabo’s passage, speaks of 
mercenary soldiers, but in my view this is not supported by Strabo.  
31
 Griffin 2005, 125-126, postulates also the existence of marine-infantry, which seems very 
probable.  
32
 Diod. XI, 72, 3. 
33
 The same opinion is also expressed by Luraghi 1994, 369-370, who seems to back the idea 
that both Gelon and Hieron relied on the lower classes of Syracuse to crew their ships.  
34
 Diod. XI 68, 2-3.  
35
 Diod. XI 76, 1.  
Andreas Morakis 
268 www.historika.unito.it 
taken part in these sea battles. In the first case, since Diodorus mentions that all 
Syracusans turned against Thrasybulus
36
, it seems probable that the fleet of the 
Syracusans was manned from members of the lower classes, while the tyrant’s 
came from his Cataneans and mercenaries
37
. In the second case, I expect the same 
synthesis for the Syracusan navy, which was presumably enlarged with ships pre-
viously belonging to the tyrants.  
 
 
Campaigns of the Democracy 
 
Twenty years after the battle of Cumae, Syracuse led another expedition 
against the Etruscans (454 BCE). This time, the tyrants no longer governed Syra-
cuse and a kind of a democracy had been established
38
. Diodorus mentions that 
the Syracusans elected Phayllus
39
 as an admiral, in order to suppress piratical 
Etruscan activity in the Tyrrhenian Sea. The admiral initially conquered the mod-
ern island of Elba but then sailed home bribed by the Etruscans. The Syracusans 
exiled him and elected another admiral, Apelles, and put him in command of 60 
ships to deal with the Etruscans. Apelles raided the coastal areas of the Etruscans 
in mainland Italy and then turned to Corsica which at the time was controlled by 
the Etruscans, raided the island, conquered the city of Elba and returned to Syra-
cuse with a great number of prisoners and spoils
40
. This expedition to Corsica 
could be related to the Syracusan port of Corsica mentioned by Diodorus and 
Ptolemy
41
. Diodorus does not mention the causes for these campaigns; however, 
modern scholars have expressed some opinions about their aims and character.  
Cristofani sees in Diodorus’ vocabulary a piratical character for this cam-
paign which aimed at the production centre of the Etruscans and not the conquer-
ing of specific places
42
. In the same context, Maddoli suggests that these cam-
paigns were aimed at the mines of Elba on which the opposite mainland area 
depended
43
; thus, the Syracusans were not interested in gaining new territories, 
 
36
 Diod. XI 67, 6-7. 
37
 Diod. XI 67, 7.  
38
 For my purposes I limit comment to saying that the democracy of Syracuse does not seem 
to have been the same as the Athenian after the reforms of Ephialtes. It was a democracy where the 
lower classes had few opportunities to participate in the government of the city. For the democracy of 
Syracuse see Hüttl 1929, 64; Maddoli 1980, 56; Consolo Langher 1997, 51-56; Rutter 2000, 137-166.  
39
 Scholars do not agree whether his name is to be restored in an inscription from the temple 
of Zeus Malophoros at Selinus; see Giuffrida Ientile 1983, 68-69, n.33; Haillet 2001, 185.  
40
 Diod. XI 88, 4-5.  
41
 Diod. V 13, 3; Ptol. III 2, 5; see also Gras 1996.  
42
 Cristofani 1987, 72, quotes the verbs «πορθέω, κατατρέχω, χειρόω». 
43
 The mining activity of the Etruscans in Elba is specifically mentioned by Diodorus (V 13, 1). 
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but in serving their economic interests in the south Tyrrhenian Sea
44
. Giuffrida 
Ientile relates these expeditions to the aim of Syracuse to control the route of the 
metal trade, adding also that the Etruscans were in a friendly relationship with 
Athens, which was a rival of Syracuse in the area
45
. Haynes says that the aim of 
the expedition was the suppression of Etruscan piracy but there were also eco-
nomic reasons
46
.  
In my view, these campaigns are proofs of Syracuse’s power since the Syra-
cusans showed that they were able to undertake major expeditions to distant 
places and attack the enemy on his own ground in more than one area (Etruria, 
Elba and Corsica). If the pretext for these expeditions was raids by Etruscan ships 
in the Tyrrhenian Sea, this is a sign that Etruscan power was not totally reduced 
after Cumae and that the latter still had a hand in the area. Nevertheless, the Syra-
cusan success and degree of penetration into Etruscan soil show that the Etruscans 
did not have the power to resist Syracuse, which is a sign of some kind of decline. 
It seems that the θαλαττοκρατούντες referred to by Diodorus for the Etruscans in 
474 BCE no longer applied.  
As for the main causes of these expeditions, these must be interpreted 
through economic reasons, motives of prestige and general political power. How-
ever, the economic explanations must not be seen through a modernistic angle of 
trade and market control in the area that would provide constant profits for Syra-
cuse. Of course the clearing of piratical activity from the area would benefit all 
kinds of traders, and naturally also the Syracusans merchants, but the control of 
commercial activity in the Tyrrhenian Sea was not a priority for Syracuse.  
 The economic reasons were of a more immediate character. On the one hand 
the Syracusans could aim at controlling the mines in Elba, which could provide 
much profit for the Syracusan state. On the other hand, Diodorus himself men-
tions that Apelles returned to Syracuse αἰχµαλώτων τε πλῆθος κοµίζων καὶ τὴν 
ἄλλην ὠφέλειαν ἄγων οὐκ ὀλίγην, that is to say that even more profit was gained. 
As for the political ground, the extensive assault on Etruscan soil manifested the 
power of Syracuse in the area to both foes and friends and proved once more her 
hegemonic role. Similarly, the Syracusan democracy proved a good successor of 
the tyrant’s policy of being the protector of the Greeks against the barbarians, an 
element that enforced even more its leading role.  
Diodorus reports that Apelles manned 60 ships for his expedition, and this is 
the first firm number given by Diodorus for any naval expedition in the West. It 
is very plausible to assume that along with the rowers, a sufficient number of in-
fantry was on board, since their existence was essential for the raids in coastal 
 
44
 Maddoli 1980, 65. 
45
 Giuffrida Ientile 1983, 70; see also Lepore 1967, 181.   
46
 Haynes 2000, 262. 
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areas and the occupation of Elba and parts of Corsica. But even in that case, ap-
proximately 10,000 rowers were needed for the expedition. And of course these 
must have been hired from the lower classes of Syracuse. It seems that these peo-
ple were gaining some power at the time. We must not exclude the possibility that 
the campaign against the Etruscans could somehow be related to the alleviation 
of the lower classes that were gathered along with Tyndarides the previous year
47
. 
It is quite probable that the lower classes managed to obtain some benefits after 
the fall of Tyndarides, so that the political unrest ceased. The campaign to Etruria 
could be of some benefit to them since they could obtain wages as rowers, pre-
sumably part of the spoils and also the notion that they were part of the Syracusan 
state, since they were contributing in a military campaign. Tyndarides’ effort to 
gain power in Syracuse has many similarities with Heracleides’, about a century 
latter. They both relied on the lower classes, while in the latter’s case Plutarch 
clearly states that he depended mainly on the naval crews
48
.  
 
The Peloponnesian War  
Diodorus does not mention any sea battles in the conflicts of Syracuse with 
Ducetius or the other cities of Sicily, such as Akragas, but under the year 439/8 
BCE he says that the Syracusans reinforced their military strength by building 100 
triremes
49
. However, this reference by Diodorus seems totally contradicted by the 
fact that during the first Sicilian expedition the small Athenian force of 20 ships 
operated undisturbed by the Syracusan fleet
50
. Thucydides mentions that Syracuse 
at that time had blocked Leontinoi by land and sea (427/6). However, apart from 
this, there is no other mention of Syracusan naval activity
51
. This weakness of 
Syracuse at sea is later clearly attested by Thucydides who says that the Syra-
cusans, although controlling the situation on land, were excluded from the sea by 
a few Athenian ships. They could not tolerate this, so they started to prepare them-
selves also at sea
52
. But what kind of arrangements were these? Building some 
triremes? Could they possess so few ships that they needed to build some more to 
confront the Athenians? How few? Even fewer than 40? So should Diodorus’ ref-
erence to 100 ships be dismissed as a whole? Or these preparations did not have 
to do with building the ships but with manning them, meaning that the Syracusans 
had to find crews in order to fill the ships and confront the small Athenian force? 
It is difficult to give definite answers to these issues, but it seems that maintaining 
 
47
 Diod. XI 86, 4-5.  
48
 For these events, see Plut. Dion, 47-50; Diod. XVI, 16-17.  
49
 Diod. XII 30, 1. 
50
 Thuc. III 86, 1. 
51
 Thuc. III 86, 4.  
52
 Thuc. III 115, 3-4. 
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a permanent fleet was not a priority for Syracuse.  
The situation for the Syracusan navy does not seem to have altered some 
years later, during the second Athenian expedition, since there are very few refer-
ences until the arrival of Gylippus (414). But even when they decided to fight the 
Athenians at sea, they never put more than 80 ships into the fight
53
. And of course 
some of these ships were not Syracusan, but belonged to their allies
54
.  
On the eve of the Sicilian expedition we hear Nicias saying in the Athenian 
assembly that Syracuse and Selinous possessed many ships and many men to man 
them, but his wording is not to be trusted, since his goal is to discourage his fellow 
country-men from voting in favor of the expedition
55
. Later on, when the Atheni-
ans were sailing to Sicily (415), Hermocrates urged his fellow-citizens to gather 
the fleet of the Sicilian cities, or at least the Syracusan fleet, and sail to confront 
the Athenians at Taranto, but his proposal was not followed
56
. Moreover, we hear 
nothing of the Syracusan fleet in Athenagoras’ speech, especially in the passage 
where he refers to the military strength of Syracuse compared with the Athenian 
forces
57
, nor in Hermocrates’ measures proposed to the Syracusans
58
, nor in the 
war preparations during the winter of 415-4 BCE
59
. Moreover, the information 
given to the Athenians by Camarina that the Syracusans were manning ships was 
proven to be false.
60
  Briefly, there is no mention of a Syracusan navy for a whole 
year from the summer of 415 BCE until the arrival of Gylippus the next summer. 
There are two possibilities for this omission; either the Syracusans avoided con-
fronting the numerous and powerful Athenian fleet, or they possessed practically 
no fleet
61
. If they had no ships, they had plenty of time to build them by the next 
 
53
 80 at Thuc. VII 22, 1; the same number also at Thuc. VII 37, 3; 76 at Thuc. VII 52, 1 and about 
the same at Thuc. VII 70, 1.  
54
 The 12 or 13 (see Kagan 1981, 276, n.44) which Gylippus brought with him (Thuc. VII 7, 1). 
Moreover, Gylippus during the winter of 414-413 BCE searched for naval reinforcements among Sy-
racuse’s allies and he may possibly have obtained some. When describing the final engagement at sea 
Thucydides (VII 70, 1) mentions that προεξαγαγόµενοι δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύµµαχοι ναυσὶ 
παραπλησίαις τὸν ἀριθµὸν καὶ πρότερον, meaning that the fleet was not wholly composed of pure 
Syracusan ships.  
55
 Thuc. VI 20, 3. 
56
 Thuc. VI 34, 3. Dover 1970, 299, followed by Kagan 1981, 220-221, suggests that if his advice 
was followed, the Sicilian fleet would have met disaster. Busolt 1904, 300, says that the Syracusans 
needed at least two months to build and man a fleet to confront the Athenians. On the other hand, Green 
1970, 134 and n. 5, though recognizing the difficulties of such a plan, finds some good arguments for it.  
57
 Thuc. VI 37, 1-2. 
58
 Thuc. VI 72. 
59
 Thuc. VI 75.  
60
 Thuc. VI 52, 1. Kagan 1981, 224, assumes that this information was given to the Athenians 
by pro-Athenian Camarineans who wanted to bring them to their city in order to seize power.  
61
 The numbers of the Athenian ships are provided by Thucydides at VI 43-44 (134 ships – 
among them 40 to carry troops – and 130 ships carried provisions for the army).  
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summer, but in that case Ι think that there should be some reference or hint in 
Thucydides.  
In contrast, the next year, after the arrival of Gylippus, there is a shift in the 
state of affairs and, from that moment, we hear more and more of the Syracusan 
fleet. The first action mentioned on behalf of the Syracusans was the capturing of 
an Athenian ship while a little later a small squadron of 12 ships led by Gylippus 
managed to enter the city
62
. At this point Thucydides states that the Syracusans 
ναυτικὸν ἐπλήρουν and they were preparing to fight also at sea
63
. The phrase 
ναυτικὸν ἐπλήρουν is to be translated as meaning that the Syracusans were man-
ning the ships. This sentence along with the absence in Thucydides of the Syra-
cusans building triremes allow us to conclude that the latter did possess a fleet but 
did not wish to confront the more experienced Athenians. Diodorus, on the other 
hand, in referring to the naval preparations of the Syracusans, adds that they were 
also building new ships and were practicing in the small harbour
64
.  
The shift in their planning has to do mainly with the arrival of Gylippus, 
along with the ships from Corinth and its allies. Gylippus had realized that victory 
could not be achieved without the neutralization of the Athenian fleet. This is why 
he tried from the beginning to find more ships among the allies of Syracuse
65
 and 
later on urges along with Hermokrates the Syracusans to fight at sea
66
. It seems 
that Gylippus played a great role in reorganizing the Syracusan fleet during the 
winter and spring of 414-413 BCE. In this reorganization a decisive role must 
have been played by the admirals of the ships from Corinth and its colonies who, 
along with their crews, were more experienced compared to the Syracusans. It is 
very clear that the transformations made in the Syracusans ships were of Corin-
thian origin
67
. This change in the balance of power at sea was very obvious to 
Nicias, who mentioned it in his letter addressed to the Athenian assembly
68
.  
Another reason for the changing of Syracusan policy on sea battles could 
concern the internal affairs. After the defeat at Epipolai, the Syracusans changed 
their generals appointing new ones and beginning some kind of discussion with 
Nicias
69
. It seems that the – let us say – moderate party, to which Hermokrates 
belonged, had lost influence and that the popular party gained the initiative. This 
 
62
 Thuc. VII 7, 1.  
63
 Thuc. VII 7, 4.  
64
 Diod. XIII 8, 5-6. The possibility of building some new triremes in the small harbor, where 
their dockyard was located as mentioned by Thucydides (VII 22, 1), is not to be excluded. But again 
in no way could a reference of Diodorus carry more weight than Thucydides.  
65
 Thuc. VII 7, 2.  
66
 Thuc. VII 21,1-3.  
67
 Thuc. VII 36, 2, Diodorus (XIII 10, 2) also attests that the Corinthian Ariston made these 
alterations to the Syracusan ships. 
68
 Thuc. VII 12-14. 
69
 Thuc. VI 103, 3-4.  
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is why the negotiations with Nicias are explained, and obviously the new generals 
were of the same political bias
70
. These generals were in charge of the Syracusan 
forces when Gylippus arrived and it is very plausible to assume that they were 
more willing for a sea battle, since they were to rely on the ship crews who were 
presumably drawn from the lower Syracusan classes. In this context it is also easy 
to explain the constitutional change which occurred after the final victory against 
Athens mentioned by Aristotle and Diodorus
71
. When Aristotle says that the de-
mos managed to change the constitution from politeia to democracy because it 
contributed to the Athenian defeat
72
, it is obvious that he has in his mind the crews 
of the ships
73
. In this last case the fleet has proven to be not only the decisive factor 
for the repulsing of the enemy but also the moving force for political reforms.  
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, I think that, following Thucydides, the first building of the 
fleet was carried out in Syracuse under the tyrants. It seems very improbable that 
Gelon did not possess a fleet since he was expecting an attack by Carthage, and I 
think that he did not use it for reasons of strategy. This fleet, probably not as big 
as 200 triremes, was possibly increased from the spoils of Himera and became a 
decisive tool of expansion for Hieron. After the fall of the tyrants it seems that the 
Syracusan democracy used the fleet in a very occasional manner. The campaigns 
against the Etruscans seem to be of a raiding character, targeted at instant eco-
nomic benefits, and we hear of no other naval expeditions in the following years. 
Diodorus’ reference to 100 ships is very much contradicted by the absence of na-
val activity on behalf of Syracuse during both the first and the second Athenian 
expeditions before Gylippus’ arrival. Either the Syracusans had few ships, or they 
had no money to man them. As for the role of the fleet in the political evolution 
of the city, the use of the navy in the last year of the Athenian expedition clearly 
led to political reforms and constitutional change. In asserting this conclusion, it 
is very plausible to assume that the lack of a permanent fleet the period 466-413 
BCE was an important factor that prevented, in a way, the emancipation of the 
lower classes, and preserved the moderate democratic regime where the medium 
and upper classes had the biggest share in the government of the city. 
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70
 Kagan 1981, 267, also refers, very vaguely though, to factional divisions.  
71
 Diod. XIII 34, 6. 
72
 Aristot. Pol. 1304a, 27-29.  
73
 See the remarks of Newman 1902, 328-329; see also Keyt 1999, 99, who identifies the de-
mos with both the ship crews and the light-armed troops. It is reasonable to assume that the demos 
who served as rowers in the sea battle, later, after the total destruction of the Athenian fleet became 
the light armed troops that pursued and harassed the retreating Athenians (Thuc. VII 78, 3, 6; 79, 5).  
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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the naval activity of Syracuse as an instrument of its expansionistic pol-
icy, and as a defensive tool aiming at repelling foreign invasions from the time of the Cartha-
ginian invasion (480) to the end of the Sicilian expedition (413). In particular, it is focused 
on the literary sources, which although in some cases are pointing to the existence of an 
important fleet, no naval activity is mentioned in them. Finally, there is special interest to the 
composition of the fleet and its role in the city’s political affairs. 
